QBTC uses post-quantum and zero-knowledge techniques on two layers of the chain.
At the consensus layer: ML-DSA
The chain’s consensus signing path uses ML-DSA (Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm), formerly known as CRYSTALS-Dilithium, standardized by NIST as FIPS 204.
Every validator’s consensus key is an ML-DSA key. Every consensus vote, every block-commit signature, every gossip message is signed with ML-DSA. There is no ECDSA or Ed25519 dependency anywhere in the consensus path.
Implemented via a fork of CometBFT at github.com/btcq-org/cometbft, which adds a crypto/mldsa package and routes signing through it.
If validators signed with Ed25519, a quantum-capable adversary could forge a validator signature and rewrite chain history. ML-DSA is lattice-based and is believed secure against known classical and quantum attacks. QBTC uses the ML-DSA-65 parameter set (NIST security category 3).
Size and bandwidth
ML-DSA signatures are larger than Ed25519:
- ML-DSA-65 signature: 3309 bytes (~3.3 KB).
- ML-DSA-65 public key: 1952 bytes (~1.9 KB).
- Ed25519 signature: 64 bytes.
- Ed25519 public key: 32 bytes.
Block size and bandwidth costs are higher accordingly. The chain absorbs the cost as part of the design.
At the claim layer: ZK proofs
A claim carries a zero-knowledge proof of control of a Bitcoin address. The Bitcoin public key does not go on chain. Once a Bitcoin public key is broadcast (during a normal spend, for example), it becomes a target for Shor’s algorithm.
The proof system is PLONK, a SNARK-style construction. The circuit verifies:
- A valid ECDSA signature by a Bitcoin key.
- That the corresponding public key hashes (via Hash160) to a specific Bitcoin address.
- Binding to a specific destination QBTC address (so a proof can’t be replayed against a different destination).
Public inputs (revealed on-chain):
- Hash160 of the Bitcoin address.
- Destination QBTC address.
Hidden inputs (not published on chain):
- Bitcoin public key.
- ECDSA signature.
Proof generation
The wallet signs a digest with the Bitcoin key and sends the signature to a proving service. The service builds the zero-knowledge proof and broadcasts the claim. The Bitcoin public key never goes on chain. See Claim Mechanism for the supported address types.
Why both layers
Each layer covers a different risk. If only consensus used ML-DSA, a claim that published your BTC public key would expose that key to a quantum attacker. If only claims used ZK, a quantum attacker could forge validator signatures and rewrite the chain.
Accounts use ML-DSA-65 too. Every account, including the validator operator account, uses an ML-DSA-65 key. The chain rejects all other key types, including secp256k1, ed25519 and multisig. QBTC sent to an address without an ML-DSA-65 key can never be spent.
References
- NIST FIPS 204: ML-DSA specification.
github.com/btcq-org/cometbft: the forked CometBFT.
x/qbtc/zk/: PLONK circuits and on-chain verifier in the chain code.
- Protocol Specification §1, §2.3.
Last modified on November 8, 2026