Summary of published findings
Published estimates and public targets point to a window of roughly 2029 to 2035 for the arrival of cryptographically-relevant quantum computers (CRQCs), defined as quantum computers capable of breaking 256-bit elliptic-curve cryptography in practical time. This is the cryptography behind Bitcoin’s ECDSA signatures.
Methodologies vary across published assessments:
- Some weight experimental progress on logical-qubit error rates.
- Some weight observed scaling trends in physical-qubit counts.
- Some weight institutional milestones (NIST PQC standardization, federal infrastructure migration mandates).
See The Quantum Threat to Bitcoin for the cited sources.
Implications
- Dormant exposed-key UTXOs are at risk first. ~1.7M BTC sit in Satoshi-era P2PK outputs whose public keys are permanently on-chain. More BTC sits in reused P2PKH / P2WPKH addresses where the public key has been revealed by prior spending. These become spendable by whoever runs Shor’s algorithm first. Per-category breakdown: indexer.qbtc.net.
- Live spending is at risk via the mempool window. Any Bitcoin spend reveals the public key. A CRQC operator could race the spender to a competing transaction.
- The migration window is now. Migrations of large-scale infrastructure take years. NIST has standardized post-quantum signatures (FIPS 204 / ML-DSA) on the assumption that public infrastructure should be substantially migrated well before CRQC arrival.
See also
Last modified on October 26, 2026